Abstract
This thesis examines institutional mechanisms for ensuring competitive neutrality between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms in Uzbekistan’s digital markets. The study is motivated by the possibility that the state may simultaneously act as an owner, regulator and major purchaser in selected digital and infrastructure markets. Such overlapping functions can create conflicts of interest and asymmetries in competitive conditions. Network effects, data advantages, platform dependence, interoperability and algorithmic governance can amplify such asymmetries into persistent market effects.
The study aims to compare international approaches to competitive neutrality with the institutional conditions of Uzbekistan’s digital markets and to develop mechanisms for maintaining a level playing field between SOEs and private firms. The research applies comparative legal, institutional and functional analysis. It draws on OECD approaches to competitive neutrality and SOE governance, the European Union’s Digital Markets Act, and Uzbekistan’s competition framework.
The analysis identifies six interconnected pillars: separation of the state’s ownership and regulatory functions; transparent accounting and separate financing of public-service obligations; competition assessment of state support; open and technology-neutral public procurement; non-discriminatory access to data and digital infrastructure; and effective monitoring, complaints and enforcement mechanisms. The study also proposes a diagnostic indicator framework for identifying potential neutrality risks. The scientific contribution is to connect the established competitive-neutrality principle with the institutional and technological characteristics of Uzbekistan’s digital markets and to translate it into a measurable compliance and enforcement architecture.